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In this note we study the endogenous formation of cooperation structures. Ac-
cording to several equilibrium concepts the full cooperation structure will form or
some structure that is payoff-equivalent to the full cooperation structure. As a
by-product we find a class of games in strategic form where several equilibrium
concepts coincide.
Journal of Economic Literature classification numbers: C71, C72.
1 Introduction
In the past few years several papers have modelled the process of distributing the payoffs
in a cooperative situation as a two-stage game. In the first stage, the players negotiate
on the cooperation structure. The second stage then determines the payoffs, usually
according to some exogenously given allocation rule.
In this note we will follow Dutta, Nouweland, and Tijs (1998). They analyze the
link formation games introduced by Myerson (1991), which were also studied by Qin
(1996). Dutta et al. (1998) find that given a superadditive game and an allocation
rule satisfying some appealing properties, the full cooperation structure will form or a
structure resulting in the same payoffs as the full cooperation structure. These results
are shown for two equilibrium concepts, undominated Nash equilibria and coalition proof
Nash equilibria. We will extend these results for several other equilibrium concepts,
specifically strictly proper, proper, weakly proper, strictly perfect and perfect equilibria.
As a by-product we find a class of games in strategic form where several equilibrium
concepts coincide.
aThe author thanks Henk Norde and Anne van den Nouweland for useful suggestions and comments.
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The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 deals with games in strategic form, e-
quilibrium concepts for such games, and the relation between these equilibrium concepts.
In section 3 we describe and analyze the link formation games. We show that according
to the equilibrium concepts described in section 2 the full cooperation structure will
form or a cooperation structure that results in the same payoff as the full cooperation
structure.
2 Games in strategic form
In this section we introduce some notation for games in strategic form. We also show
some relationships between equilibrium concepts, which will be used in the subsequent
section on link formation games. For a survey of equilibrium concepts for games in
strategic form we refer to Van Damme (1991).
Let Γ = (N ; (Si)i∈N ; (fi)i∈N ) be a game in strategic form, where N = {1, . . . , n}
denotes the player set, Si the strategy space of player i, and fi the payoff function of
player i, which assigns to every tuple s ∈ S =
∏
i∈N Si a payoff fi(s) ∈ IR. Denote
f = (fi)i∈N .
The first equilibrium concept we define is the undominated Nash equilibrium. Recall
that a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player can improve his payoff by a
unilateral deviation. For any i ∈ N , si dominates s′i if for all s−i ∈ S−i :=
∏
j∈N\{i} Si,
fi(si, s−i) ≥ fi(s′i, s−i) with the inequality being strict for some s−i ∈ S−i. Now, s
∗
i ∈ Si
is an undominated strategy if there is no si ∈ Si such that si dominates s∗i . Let S
u
i (Γ)




i (Γ). If no
confusion on the underlying game can arise we simply write Sui and S
u. A strategy tuple
s is an undominated Nash equilibrium if s is a Nash equilibrium and s ∈ Su.
A strategy si of player i is a weakly dominant strategy if for all s−i ∈ S−i and all
s′i ∈ Si, fi(si, s−i) ≥ fi(s
′
i, s−i). Denote the set of weakly dominant strategies of player





i (Γ). We also write S
w
i and S
w if no confusion
on Γ can arise. Note that every s ∈ Sw is a Nash equilibrium and that every weakly
dominant strategy is undominated.
The following lemma shows that if a player has a weakly dominant strategy, then all
his undominated strategies are weakly dominant.





Proof: Obviously, Swi ⊆ S
u
i . Assume S
w
i 6= ∅, so there exists si ∈ S
w





will show that s′i is a weakly dominant strategy. Since si is a weakly dominant strategy it
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holds for all s−i ∈ S−i that fi(si, s−i) ≥ fi(s′i, s−i). But s
′
i is undominated and hence this
inequality holds with equality for all s−i ∈ S−i. Since si is a weakly dominant strategy




i . This completes
the proof. 2
Remark 2.1 Note that if si, s′i ∈ S
w
i (Γ) then for all s−i ∈ S−i it holds that fi(si, s−i) =
fi(s′i, s−i).
From now on assume that the strategy space of every player is finite, i.e. |Si| < ∞
for all i ∈ N . A mixed strategy pi of player i is a probability distribution on Si. The
probability player i assigns to strategy k ∈ Si will be denoted by pki . Hence, the set of
mixed strategies of player i is described by1
Pi :=
pi ∈ IRSi | ∑
k∈Si
pki = 1, p
k
i ≥ 0 for all k ∈ Si
 .
Denote Γp = (N ; (Pi)i∈N ; (f ′i)i∈N ), the mixed extension of Γ, where f
′
i(p) denotes the
expected payoff to player i according to mixed strategy profile p = (pi)i∈N ∈ P :=∏









For notational convenience we define for all i ∈ N and all s−i ∈ S−i the probability
that the players in N\{i} play s−i by,






For all i ∈ N and all k ∈ Si denote the mixed strategy associated with pure strategy k
of player i by ei,k. So,
eli,k =
 1 , if l = k0 , otherwise .
Furthermore, we denote for all s ∈ S, es = (ei,si)i∈N .
Before we can define strictly proper equilibria we need some more notation. For all









i , for all k ∈ Si
}
.




++ the set of Nash equilibria of the game
(N ;P1(η1), . . . , Pn(ηn); f ′) is denoted by E(Γp, η). This game is called a perturbed game.
1For notational convenience we will simply write Pi in stead of P (Si).
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In such a perturbed game every player plays each of his strategies with at least some pre-








++; η < η̂}.
Now, we can describe the strictly proper equilibria of a strategic form game Γ. A
strategy profile p ∈ P is a strictly proper equilibrium of Γ if there exists some η̂ ∈∏
i∈N IR
Si
++ and a continuous map η → p(η) from Uη̂ to P =
∏
i∈N Pi such that p(η) ∈
E(Γp, η) for all η and limη↓0 p(η) = p. The set of strictly proper Nash equilibria in Γ
will be denoted by StrProp(Γ). Note that by definition a strictly proper equilibrium of a
strategic form game is a mixed strategy of that game. This strategy does not necessarily
correspond to a pure strategy.
In the following lemma we show that every weakly dominant strategy in the mixed
extension of a game puts positive weights on strategies that are weakly dominant in the
original game.
Lemma 2.2 Let Γ be a game in strategic form. Then
Swi (Γ




Proof: First we will show that Swi (Γ




and suppose pi 6∈ conv{ei,k | k ∈ Swi (Γ)}. Note that every mixed strategy is a convex





Since pi 6∈ conv{ei,k | k ∈ Swi (Γ)} there exists l ∈ Si with l 6∈ S
w
i (Γ) and p
l
i > 0. Since
l 6∈ Swi (Γ) there exists l̂ ∈ Si and s−i ∈ S−i such that fi(l̂, s−i) > f(l, s−i). Now, define
p̂ki =

pki , for all k ∈ Si\{l, l̂}
pki + p
l
i , k = l̂
0 , k = l
.
Let p−i = (pj)j∈N\{i} be the mixed strategy profile of N\{i} associated with s−i, i.e.
p−i = (ej,sj)j∈N\{i}. If player i plays p̂i instead of pi against p−i he improves his payoff,
since






fi(l̂, s−i)− fi(l, s−i)
)
> 0.
So, pi 6∈ Swi (Γ
p), a contradiction with pi ∈ Swi (Γ
p). Hence,
Swi (Γ
p) ⊆ conv{ei,k | k ∈ S
w
i (Γ)}.




fore, let pi ∈ conv{ei,k | k ∈ Swi (Γ)}. Let p−i ∈ P−i :=
∏
j∈N\{i}Pj and let p̂i ∈ Pi.
2Conv{A} denotes the set of all convex combinations of elements of A, where conv{∅} := ∅.
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Then





























= f ′i(p̂i, p−i),
where the equalities follow by definition of the strategies. The inequality follows since





So, pi is a weakly dominant strategy in Γp. Hence,
Swi (Γ
p) ⊇ conv{ei,k | k ∈ S
w
i (Γ)}.
This completes the proof. 2
Before we can prove the main result of this section, we need two more lemmas. First
we show that every weakly dominant mixed strategy profile is a strictly proper Nash
equilibrium.
Lemma 2.3 Let Γ be a game in strategic form. Then
Sw(Γp) ⊆ StrProp(Γ).
Proof: Let p ∈ Sw(Γp). We have to show that p ∈ StrProp(Γ). By lemma 2.2 it holds

















for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and all
k ∈ Si. For all η ∈ Uη̂, all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and all k ∈ Swi (Γ) let
qli,k(η) =
 ηli , for all l ∈ Si\{k}1−∑r∈Si\{k} ηri , l = k . (1)
Furthermore, let qi(η) =
∑
k∈Swi (Γ)
pki qi,k(η) for all i ∈ N . Note that qi(η) ∈ Pi(ηi) for all
i ∈ N since qli,k(η) ≥ η
l
i for all k ∈ S
w
i (Γ), all l ∈ Si, and all i ∈ N .
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Let i ∈ N . For all k ∈ Swi (Γ) the map η → qi,k(η) from Uη̂ to Pi is continuous,
with qi,k(η) ∈ Pi(ηi) for all η, and limη↓0 qi,k(η) = ei,k. Then it follows immediately that
η → q(η) = (qi(η))i∈N is a continuous map from Uη̂ to P with limη↓0 q(η) = p = (pi)i∈N .
It remains to show that q(η) ∈ E(Γp, η), for all η ∈ Uη̂ . Therefore, let η ∈ Uη̂ and
consider a possible deviation of player i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ui ∈ Pi(ηi). The change in payoff
for player i by deviating from qi(η) to ui is equal to














































where the equalities follow by definition of the strategies. The inequality holds since for




i and since for all k ∈ S
w
i (Γ), all
l ∈ Si\{k}, and all t−i ∈ S−i, fi(k, t−i)− fi(l, t−i) ≥ 0.
This completes the proof. 2
The following result is taken from Van Damme (1991).
Lemma 2.4 For a game in strategic form Γ
StrProp(Γ) ⊆ Su(Γp).
Proof: See Van Damme (1991). 2
We can now state the main result of this section.
Theorem 2.1 Let Γ be a game in strategic form. If Sw(Γ) 6= ∅ then
Su(Γp) = StrProp(Γ) = Sw(Γp) =
∏
i∈N
conv{ei,k | k ∈ S
w
i (Γ)}.
Proof: Assume Sw(Γ) 6= ∅. Then
StrProp(Γ) ⊆ Su(Γp) = Sw(Γp) ⊆ StrProp(Γ)
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by lemmas 2.4, 2.1, and 2.3 respectively. Lemma 2.2 completes the proof. 2
Recall that every profile of weakly dominant strategies is a Nash equilibrium. Hence,
by lemma 2.1, if every player has a weakly dominant strategy then every strategy pro-
file consisting only of undominated strategies is a Nash equilibrium. There are several
equilibrium concepts that result in supersets of the set of strictly proper Nash equilibria
and subsets of the set of undominated Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. For a survey
see Van Damme (1991). He shows that for a strategic form game with a finite strat-
egy space for all players the sets of (i) proper equilibria, (ii) weakly proper equilibria,
(iii) strictly perfect equilibria, and (iv) perfect equilibria are all supersets of the set of
strictly proper equilibria and subsets of the set of undominated Nash equilibria in mixed
strategies. Using this and the theorem above the following corollary results for strategic
form games with a weakly dominant strategy for all players.
Corollary 2.1 Let Γ be a game in strategic form. If Sw(Γ) 6= ∅ then the following sets
of equilibria coincide with Sw(Γp) and the set of undominated Nash equilibria in mixed
strategies : strictly proper, proper, weakly proper, strictly perfect, and perfect equilibria.
3 Link formation
In this section we will describe and analyze a class of link formation games, introduced
by Myerson (1991) and also studied by Qin (1996) and Dutta et al. (1998).
A communication situation is a triple (N, v, L), with (N, v) a cooperative game and
(N,L) a cooperation graph (N,L). So, N = {1, . . . , n} denotes the player set, v the
characteristic function that assigns to every subset of N a value, and L a set of pairs of
players in N , describing the cooperation possibilities between the players.
The pair (N,L) is an undirected (communication) graph. A link in the graph indicates
that the players forming this link can cooperate with each other directly. If two players
are not connected directly but there is a path in the graph between the players, then
these two players can communicate with each other indirectly via the players on the path.
The notion of connectedness induces a partition of the player set into communication
components, where i and j are in the same component if and only if i = j or i and j
can communicate with each other, directly or indirectly. The resulting partition will be
denoted by N/L.
An allocation rule γ assigns to every communication situation (N, v, L) a payoff vector
γ(N, v, L) ∈ IRN . Here, we will restrict ourselves to the same class of allocation rules as
studied by Dutta et al. (1998). This class is described by the following properties.
8
• Component efficiency (CE): For all communication situations (N, v, L) and all
communication components C ∈ N/L it holds that
∑
i∈C γi(N, v, L) = v(C).
• Weak link symmetry (WLS): For all communication situations (N, v, L) and
all i, j ∈ N , if γi(N, v, L ∪ {{i, j}}) > γi(N, v, L) then γj(N, v, L ∪ {{i, j}}) >
γj(N, v, L).
• Improvement property (IP): For all communication situations (N, v, L) and all
i, j ∈ N , if there exists k ∈ N\{i, j} with γk(N, v, L∪{{i, j}}) > γk(N, v, L), then
γi(N, v, L ∪ {{i, j}}) > γi(N, v, L) or γj(N, v, L ∪ {{i, j}}) > γj(N, v, L).
The following lemma was proven by Dutta et al. (1998).
Lemma 3.1 Let γ be an allocation rule that satisfies CE, WLS, and IP and (N, v, L) a
communication situation with (N, v) superadditive.3 For all i, j ∈ N it holds that
γi(N, v, L ∪ {{i, j}}) ≥ γi(N, v, L). (2)
Proof: See Dutta et al. (1998) 2
The property incorporated in equation (2) will be called link monotonicity.
We will now describe the class of link formation games. Let γ be an allocation rule
and (N, v) a cooperative game. The link formation game Γ(N, v, γ) is described by the
tuple (N ; (Si)i∈N ; (f
γ
i )i∈N) where for all i ∈ N the set Si = 2
N\{i} represents the strategy
set of player i. A strategy of player i is an announcement of the set of players he wants
to form communication links with. A communication link between two players will only
form if both players want to form the link. The set of links that will form according to
strategy profile s ∈ S =
∏
i∈N Si will be denoted by
L(s) := {{i, j} ⊆ N | i ∈ sj , j ∈ si}.
The payoff function fγ = (fγi )i∈N is defined as the allocation rule γ applied to the
communication situation (N, v, L(s)), i.e.
fγ(s) = γ(N, v, L(s)).
In the following lemma we show that the link formation games described above have
a weakly dominant strategy profile. Moreover, this strategy profile results in the full
cooperation structure (i.e. every player cooperates directly with every other player).
This strategy profile is denoted by s̄, i.e. s̄i = N\{i} for all i ∈ N .
3The game (N, v) is superadditive if for all S, T ∈ 2N with S ∩ T = ∅, v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ).
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Lemma 3.2 Let γ be an allocation rule that satisfies CE, WLS, and IP and (N, v) a
superadditive cooperative game. Then s is a weakly dominant strategy profile in the
associated link formation game Γ := Γ(N, v, γ).
Proof: Let i ∈ N , si ∈ Si and s−i ∈ S−i. Define the following sets of links: L1 =
L(si, s−i) and L2 = L(si, s−i). Since si ⊆ si it holds that L2 ⊆ L1. Furthermore,
L1\L2 ⊆ {{i, j} | j ∈ N\{i}}, since only the strategy of player i has been changed. If
we apply lemma 3.1 for all {i, j} ∈ L1\L2 then
fγi (si, s−i) = γi(N, v, L
1) ≥ γi(N, v, L
2) = fγi (si, s−i). (3)
We conclude that si ∈ Swi (Γ) and hence, s ∈ S
w(Γ). 2
Lemma 3.2 was not proven explicitly in Dutta et al. (1998). However, they showed it
implicitly in showing that s̄ is an undominated Nash equilibrium.
Now that we have showed the existence of a weakly dominant strategy profile we
can use the results of the previous section to give some relations between equilibrium
concepts for mixed extensions of link formation games.
Theorem 3.1 Let γ be an allocation rule that satisfies CE, WLS, and IP and let (N, v)
be a superadditive cooperative game. Then the following relations between several equi-




conv{ei,k | k ∈ S
w
i (Γ)} = S
u(Γp) = StrProp(Γ) = Sw(Γp). (4)
Proof: From lemma 3.2 it follows that s ∈ Sw(Γ). Then it follows from theorem 2.1
that
Su(Γp) = StrProp(Γ) = Sw(Γp) =
∏
i∈N
conv{ei,k | k ∈ S
w
i (Γ)}.




conv{ei,k | k ∈ S
w
i (Γ)}.
This completes the proof. 2
Note that the result in theorem 3.1 depends only on the assumption that γ satisfies
link monotonicity, which is implied by CE, WLS, and IP.
Remark 3.1 Obviously we can also extend the theorem above to include proper, weakly
proper, strictly perfect and perfect equilibria (see corollary 2.1).
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Remark 3.2 It can be shown that if γ satisfies CE, WLS, and IP then fγi (s) =
fγi (s
′
i, s−i) for some i ∈ N implies that f
γ(s) = fγ(s′i, s−i) (This follows directly from
lemmas 1 and 2 in Dutta et al. (1998)). So, if γ satisfies CE, WLS, and IP then this
implies that all weakly dominant strategy profiles result in the same payoff. Dutta et
al. (1998) call structures that lead to identical payoffs payoff-equivalent. Furthermore,
they call a structure essentially complete if it is payoff-equivalent to the full coopera-
tion structure. The structures that can result according to any p ∈ Su(Γ(N, v, γ)p) =
StrProp(Γ(N, v, γ)) are obviously all essentially complete. We cannot speak of the struc-
ture that will result since p is a mixed strategy profile.
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